At
the first instance, the learned counsel for the appellants strongly
argued that there was perversity and illegality involved
in the decision rendered by the Tribunal, which was affirmed by
the High Court. It was also argued on behalf of the appellants that a
fair and reasonable opportunity of hearing was afforded to the respondent
and the charge-sheet did not suffer any discrepancy as it sufficiently
enabled the respondent to defend his case. Furthermore, it was contended that
the charges framed were not vague and were serious cases of misconduct.
It was further argued that the Tribunal and the High100 Court had appreciated the evidence
wrongly and it would not be in the interest of appellant-company to keep
a120 /// workman who has developed the
habit of abusing superiors with filthy language and disobeying
their orders. Accordingly, the learned counsel for the appellants prayed for
setting aside the judgment of the High Court as well as of the
Industrial Tribunal and restoration of the order of dismissal passed against
the respondent. The learned counsel for the respondent contended that the
respondent was denied a fair hearing and was dismissed in violations of the principles
of natural justice. It was argued200
on behalf of the respondent that the charge-sheet did not contain the specific
abusive language and thus it was difficult for him to
defend his case. He further argued that the respondent was not furnished
with the list of witnesses240 ///
and copy of the documents to be treated as evidences and materials on
which the management was to rely and he was also denied a chance of being
represented by a lawyer or a representative who is equipped with legal
background during the enquiry proceedings. The learned counsel for the
respondent also contended that the appellants had not presented before300 the Court any documentary evidence
to prove that he had on earlier occasion misconducted himself and was thus in a
habit of disobeying his superiors. The learned counsel also strongly
argued that the work assigned to the respondent was not part of his duty as he
was appointed to carry things from one place to another outside the
shop. Finally,360 /// the
learned counsel for the respondent argued that since the concurrent
findings of fact arrived at on the question formulated hereinabove, it
is not open to this Court to exercise its discretionary power
under Article 136 of the400 Constitution
to interfere with the impugned order on such concurrent findings of
fact.
Let
us first delve into the most crucial question raised in this appeal that is,
whether there was violation of principle of natural justice. The principle of
natural justice is attracted whenever a person suffers a civil consequence or a
prejudice is caused to him by an administrative action. In other
words, principle of natural justice is attracted where there is some right which
is likely to480 /// be
affected by any act of the administration including a legitimate
expectation. The second appeal has been dismissed by the500 // Board of Revenue by the impugned
order on 11th May, 2011 holding that no substantial question of law was
involved and accordingly, the orders dated 31.3.2011 and the order dated
27.12.2008 were upheld. The proceedings arose out of a suit under Section 176
of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act for partition. The dispute further indicates
that it centres around the property acquired under the sale deeds
wherein the respondents-plaintiffs claimed equal shares to the extent of 1/7th
share each whereas600 /// the
petitioners-defendants contend that apart from the land under the sale deed
dated 10.5.1988 where the shares have been indicated as 1/7th each, the share
of the other parties, which was subject matter of different sale
deeds brought on record through a short counter affidavit have to be
distributed by allocating 1/8th share to the contesting respondent nos.
1 to 3 whereas the petitioner nos. 4, 5 and 6 are entitled to 1/6th share each.
The trial court proceeded with the matter and from the order sheet it
appears that the plaintiffs'700
witnesses were being cross-examined. The order sheet dated 20th
September, 2008 indicates adjournments of the case on720 /// the ground of further cross-examination of
the plaintiffs' witnesses and the date fixed was 25.9.2008. The learned counsel
for the petitioner Shri S.K. Purwar contends that the dispute, which was raised
with regard to the shares, could have been decided and adjudicated
only after the cross-examination of the plaintiffs’ witnesses was completed,
but without proceeding with the same and only fixing dates on the
application the suit was decreed on800
27.12.2008, which prejudices the claim
of the petitioners. He further submits that the petitioners have been denied
the opportunity of cross-examination and the trial Court hastily proceeded to
decree the suit depriving the petitioners of the840 /// opportunity of putting the witness to cross-examination on
that issue.
A
short counter affidavit has been filed by the learned counsel appearing on behalf
of the respondents contesting herein, namely, respondent nos. 4 to 7. He
contends that the sale deeds that are being made the basis of the claim of
petitioners-defendants do not indicate any specified share900 and, therefore, a presumption in
view of the provisions of Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act is
to be made that the plaintiffs and the defendants all had equal shares in
the land which are subject matter of the said sale deeds and hence the dispute
which is now sought to be raised by the petitioners is purely960 /// unfounded and proceedings are being
pursued on a very highly technical ground. He contends that as a matter of fact
the petitioners are trying to take undue advantage of the absence of one
of the brothers of the answering respondents1000
and the shares were very well known at the time of execution of the sale
deed which also stands corroborated by the sale deed dated 10th May,
1988, whereby 1/7th share has been indicated in respect of all the
parties.1043
