We have heard the counsel on both
sides. The facts are that the respondents were engaged on daily wages on
muster roll basis in Central Scheme and were paid out of the funds provided by
the Central Government. It is stated that after the scheme was
closed, their services were dispensed with. When the respondents filed the writ
petition in the High Court, the High Court gave interim direction
dated 6th January, 1993 and directed them to be re-engaged
elsewhere. Pursuant to the interim direction, the writ petition came to
be disposed of on March 9, 1993. Thus,100 this appeal is by special leave.
It is seen that when the project is completed and closed due to
non-availability of120 funds, consequently, the employees have to go along with the
closed project. The High Court was not right in giving the direction to
regularize them or to continue them in other places. No vested right is created
in temporary employment. Directions cannot be given to regularize their
services in the absence of any existing vacancies nor directions be given to
create posts by the State to a non-existent establishment. The Court
would adopt pragmatic approach in giving directions. The directions200 would amount to creating of posts
and continuing them in spite of non-availability of the work. We are of
considered view that the directions issued by the High Court are absolutely
illegal warranting our interference. The order of the High240 Court is set aside. The appeal is
allowed.
We have heard learned counsel for the parties. The short question
which arises for consideration is whether the High Court was right in coming to
the conclusion that a plot of land which had been allotted to the appellant could
not have been converted to a residential plot on which construction could300 be made in as much as
it was meant to be an open space. The proceedings before the High Court
were initiated on a writ petition being filed by the respondent as a Public
Interest Litigation, inter alia, contending that the respondent had
purchased a plot of land on the understanding that the plot in question in
the present appeal360 was really an open space adjoining a kindergarten school.
The respondent found in 1995 that the appellant was constructing a house and
thereupon a writ petition was filed in the High Court which issued notice and
on 8th400 of March, 1995 granted stay of further construction. The High
Court ultimately allowed the writ petition and came to the conclusion that in as
much as the plot in question was earmarked as an open area adjoining a
school, it could not have been converted into a residential plot without
following an appropriate procedure. On behalf of the appellant, our
attention has been drawn to a notification dated 15th February, 1941
whereby Development Plan of the area in480 question was approved. It is not in dispute that as per
this Notification, in the Development Plan the plot in500 question, purchased by the
appellant, was shown as a residential plot. Of course, this area had earlier
been earmarked as an open space but by virtue of the Development Plan, now
approved on 15th February, 1991, the change of user had occurred. The
respondent in the writ petition, filed in the High Court, had not challenged
this Notification of 15th February, 1991. The High Court, in turn, also
did not quash this Notification. There being no challenge to this Notification,
the Development Plan which was so approved become final. The land use which was
shown in600 the Development plan not having been challenged, we fail to
appreciate as to how the High Court could have ignored this fact and come to a
contrary conclusion. The appellant had purchased this plot of land in April,
1991 and had admittedly started construction in January, 1995. The writ
petition was filed nearly four years after the approval of the Development Plan
vide Notification dated 15th February, 1991 and apart from the questions of laches,
even on merits, there was no reason for the High Court to have interfered when
the residential plot shown700 in the duly approved Development plan had been allotted as a
residential plot to the appellant and was used for720 constructing a residential unit
therein. Merely because at an earlier point of time when the respondent had
constructed his house this plot had been shown as an open space cannot give a
right to the respondent to ask the High Court to prevent the
construction on that area when the respondent has chosen not to challenge the
change in the land use from open space to residential as per the approved plan.
On this ground alone, in our opinion, the800 writ petition filed by the
respondent should have been dismissed. For the aforesaid reasons, the
appeal is allowed. The judgement of the High Court is set aside and the
writ petition filed by the respondent is dismissed. However, there will be,840 no order as to costs.
The appellant was appointed as Sub-Inspector, Food &
Supplies by respondent no. 2 on 13.4.1975 on ad-hoc basis against service-man
quota. The post was purely temporary, liable to be terminated without notice
and without assigning any reasons or on arrival of a regular candidate. The
appellant continued in service on900 that post till November 17, 1980, when his services were
terminated. Prior to the termination of his services, he was placed under
suspension on April 15, 1980 in view of the criminal
proceedings under Section 420 of Indian Penal Code pending against
him and before the culmination of criminal proceedings, his services were
terminated by order dated960 November 17, 1980, as aforesaid.
Criminal case against the appellant was decided on October
21, 1981 wherein he was acquitted of the charge. The appellant on
receiving the order of termination of his services filed Civil1000 Suit 453 of 1981 in the court of
Senior Sub-Judge praying for a declaration that the orders of suspension as
also termination were illegal, wrong, arbitrary and without jurisdiction
and that the appellant was entitled to reinstatement and regularisation
of his service under the Government Notification dated 1.1.1980 issued by the
Chief Secretary to the Government of Haryana authorising regularisation of such
ad-hoc employees who held the Class III posts for a minimum1080 period of two years.
According to the appellant, his
case was covered by the said notification and as such he1100 was entitled to all the benefits
of service. The Senior Sub Judge held that as the appellant was acquitted o
f the offence, the authorities should have revoked the
suspension order and should have paid the pay for the period for which the
appellant remained under suspension and thus allowed to the appellant all the
benefits. An appeal was taken by the respondents to the Additional
District Judge who affirmed the order of the trial court holding that no
enquiry was conducted before termination of service of the appellant.1188
