We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the appellant-accused and
the learned counsel appearing for the State of Tamil Nadu at length today. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that the
High Court erred in convicting the appellant by solely relying upon the testimonies
of the relatives of the deceased. The learned counsel further submitted
that the appellant should have been acquitted by giving him the benefit
of doubt, particularly when the Trial Court disbelieved the prosecution's
case and acquitted the co-accused. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the State submitted that the High Court100 has considered all the evidence on
record and rendered a well-reasoned judgment which does not merit any interference
by120 this Court.
With respect to
the first submission of the counsel for the appellant, regarding the
testimonies of related witnesses, it is settled law that the testimony of a
related or an interested witness can be taken into consideration, with the
additional burden on the Court in such cases to carefully scrutinize
such evidence. As such, the mere submission of the counsel for the
appellant, that the testimonies of the witnesses in the case should be disregarded
because they were200 related, without bringing to the attention of the Court any
reason to disbelieve the same, cannot be countenanced. The counsel for the appellant next submitted that the benefit
of doubt extended to his co-accused should also have been
extended to240 him. According to him, once the co-accused were acquitted, the
appellant should also have been acquitted. However, there is no such
principle of law that requires automatic acquittal of an accused because
of the acquittal of the co-accused. The same is a settled position of law, which
has been reiterated by this Court in numerous judgments. The point
to be300 considered is the nature of the evidence
against the co-accused that were acquitted in comparison with the
evidence against the present appellant. A bare perusal of the judgment of the
Trial Court indicates that the nature and quality of evidence against the
appellant-accused was distinct from that which was adduced
against his co-accused.
The Trial Court
noted that the other360 co-accused were the aunt, mother and grandfather of the
present appellant. The Court noted that the grandfather was 70 years old, and
could not even stand straight, let alone cause any injury to one of the
witnesses. Further, with respect400 to the actions attributed to the aunt
and the mother of the present appellant, the Trial Court held that they appear
to be exaggerations and an afterthought, as they were not
even included in the complaint. The Court ultimately held that apart
from the fact that the aunt, mother and grandfather of the present
appellant were present at the scene of the occurrence, there was no
concrete evidence in the depositions of the eyewitnesses to
indicate that they caused injuries480 to the witnesses.
On the other hand, when it comes to the appellant, the evidence against him is consistent,
with500 the depositions
in Court being in line with the complaint and statements made before the
police. The appellant is the main accused, who is stated to have attacked the complainant
and caused him injuries as well as hit the deceased on her head with an
iron rod, resulting in her death. The allegations against the appellant
are in line with the chargesheet, the wound certificate regarding the
complainant and the postmortem report of the deceased. It is for the
above reasons that the Trial Court distinguished between the
prosecution's case against the appellant and the co-accused and we see no600 reason to interfere with the same.
The counsel for
the appellant lastly argued that once the witnesses had been disbelieved
with respect to the co-accused, their testimonies with respect to the
present accused must also be discarded. The counsel is, in
effect, relying on the legal maxim "false in one thing, false in
everything", which Indian Courts have always been reluctant
to apply. This maxim has not received general acceptance in different jurisdictions
in India nor has this maxim come to occupy the status of a rule of law. It is
merely a rule of caution. All that it amounts700 to is that in such cases
the testimony may be disregarded and not that it must be disregarded.
The Trial720 Court, as mentioned above, has
given specific reasons for disbelieving the testimony of the witnesses with
respect to the co-accused, and extending the benefit of doubt to
them, while convicting the appellant on the strength of the evidence against
him. We find no infirmity in the approach of the Trial Court. We also find that the High Court, in the impugned judgment, has taken
into account the submissions of the counsel for the appellant, and
considered the entire evidence, in800 order to come to the finding that
there was a free fight as the appellant also sustained injuries and had
even attempted to make a complaint. On the basis of the above, the High
Court modified the conviction and sentence840 imposed on the appellant. The counsel for the appellant has not been able to point
out any infirmity in the findings of the High Court. We therefore see no
reason to interfere with the impugned Judgment passed by the High Court. We
find no merit in the appeal and the same is, accordingly, dismissed.
We have heard the arguments of900 the learned counsel appearing for the appellant and the
learned standing counsel appearing for the State. It is the contention of the learned counsel appearing for the appellant
that there is no direct evidence attributable to the role of the accused
and High Court has based the order of conviction on circumstantial evidence.
He has contended that prosecution has not960 been able to establish the chain of events on the basis of circumstantial
evidence, all leading to the one and only conclusion, namely the guilt of
the accused.
He would submit
that conviction has been based solely on the basis1000 of confessional statement
alleged to have been given by the appellant to the police in terms of
Section 27 of the Evidence Act. The said evidence is not reliable and ought not
to have been accepted since it was written in the Kannada language
which was not known to the accused. He contended that according to the
prosecution, the accused had given a confessional statement at the police
station in Malayalam in the presence of PW-10 who translated1080 the same to Kannada and undisputedly
PW-10 did not know how to write and read Kannada but was only able1100 to speak Kannada language and as
such the translated version of appellant's alleged confession to the
police could not be acceptable evidence.
There being no
evidence available on record as to the person who had got it typed on a computer
and who had taken the printout of the same was itself sufficient
to disbelieve the said statement and there was no explanation forthcoming
from prosecution. On these aspects, as rightly pointed out by the Trial Court,
the High Court ought not to have interfered with the well-reasoned order of
acquittal passed by the Trial Court.1196
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