Monday, 4 October 2021

ENGLISH SHORTHAND DICTATION-178

 

In the present situation in India, the separatist tendency is very strong, and provincial and local parochialism is more dominant than national feeling. While we are building up a federated India with complete autonomy of the units, we still have the problem of making India as a whole a strong and united country. I would make this further observation that I do not think that the reservation of powers in the Central Government is likely to affect the autonomy of the provinces. The reservation of powers as interpreted by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the case of Canada has not had this over-riding effect. It means a power that comes into existence in an emergency in a120 field not specifically allotted to the provinces. I do not think that the provincial autonomy should be really affected. 140 The second thing I should like to observe in connection with this question of provincial autonomy is that this autonomy must160 be limited by the affording of protection for the interests of the minorities and of the Depressed Classes. As I visualize the situation in India as it will result from the new constitution, I find there will be certain provinces in which some communities will be in a majority, but in all the provinces the Depressed Classes, whom I represent, will be in a minority. They will be in a minority in every province. I cannot understand how we240 can at this stage permit the provincial majorities to have a complete uninterrupted and undiluted sway over the destinies of these poor people, without any right of appeal being given to the latter in regard to maladministration or neglect of280 their interests. There must be some authority somewhere, over and above the Provincial Government, which will be in a position to intervene and rescue them from any adverse position in which they may be placed by the provincial majorities. These are the320 three things which, in my opinion, must limit the autonomy of the future Provincial Governments of India.

          Coming to the question of the character of responsibility in the Provincial Governments, my first observation is that the whole question360 of responsibility in the provincial Legislature is entirely dependent upon the kind of Legislature that you are going to get in the provinces. Is the Legislature that you are going to get in the provinces is a Legislature which is going to be a mirror of the whole population of the province? Is it going to be thoroughly representative and420 not merely representative as a museum is, where there are a few specimens of every species for the observation of the general onlooker? If every minority and every class, which fears its existence will be jeopardized, is placed on a position to make its influence felt, then I think in a Legislature of that sort there will be no harm480 in conceding the principle that provincial responsibility may be introduced to the fullest extent. That is my first observation. Making that a condition that the Legislatures shall be fully and adequately representative of all the classes, I see no objection to the subjects which are now reserved being transferred to popular control. Coming to the question of whether the responsibility in the provinces should be joint or should be individual, I have not the slightest hesitation in saying that the560 responsibility not only should be joint but must be joint. I have been a member of Legislative Council, and I have seen how Ministries in the provinces have worked. It has been a most painful experience for me, as it600 has been the experience of many of those who have had the misfortune or the good fortune to be members of a Legislative Council,  to find that Ministries have been working as a kind of loose confederation, without having any640 complete or unanimous view on a particular policy which they adopted. There have been divided counsels, and cases of Ministers not being very willing to support each other. What has been the result? The result is that in no instance have we had any considered policy put forward by the Cabinet as a whole, worked out in detail and placed700 before the Legislative Council. Things have been done by fits and starts, and I do not think we want our720 responsibility in future to be bungled in that fashion. Turning now to the question of communal representation in the Cabinets, I must confess that I am not very much drawn to the suggestion which is often made that there should be communal representation in the Cabinet. I am not, of course, oblivious of the fact. In fact, I am very conscious of it that if the minority communities are not represented in the Cabinet, it is very much possible, and800 even very likely, that in matters of administration which affect their daily lives, their interests may be affected very prejudicially by the policy of Ministers whose dominant interest is communalism. I do not forget that for a moment, but my submission840 is that there is a better way of dealing with that sort of evil. It seems to me that if the minorities could get constitutional and statutory guarantees laid down in the Constitutional Act itself against anything likely to injure their interests being done or left undone by the Cabinet, the danger which most of us apprehend from the fact that the Cabinets may be communally dominated, will vanish, and we shall not have much cause to insist on communal representation in the Cabinet. Although I am very desirous that the Chief Minister should recognize or should be made to recognize the interest of having most of the important minorities represented in the Cabinet, we cannot for the moment960 forget that, after all, a Cabinet office is a very responsible office. A Cabinet Minister has not merely to look after the980 interests of the minorities; he has to see to the safety and interest of the province as a whole. That demands ability and competence; it does not merely demand a communal outlook, and it is from that point of view that I look at the matter. I should like to have the interests of the minorities and the Depressed Classes safeguarded in such a manner that constitutionally it would be impossible for Ministers drawn from the majority communities to do anything prejudicial to the minorities or to neglect their interests. Coming to the question of the relations between1080 the Governor and his Ministry, I think one thing is obvious that no constitution can permit the Governor the power to interfere in the day-to-day administration of the country, if it is really to embody a responsible Government and collective responsibility. 1120 That would run quite across the system of responsible Government and collective responsibility. The Ministry must be allowed to carry on the day-to-day administration on the basis of joint responsibility. When we come to the question of the emergency powers, it is suggested that it should be left with the Governor. I find myself in a somewhat difficult position, because I do not understand exactly what is meant. Is it meant that when an emergency arises, the Governor1200 should simply dismiss the Ministry and have nothing to do with it, and should promulgate whatever laws, ordinances or measures he thinks are necessary to meet the situation, notwithstanding the fact that they are opposed by the Ministry? I do not know what is wanted.  I can quite understand the Governor should have the absolute, undoubted and unrestricted power of dismissing1260 a Ministry which he thinks is not acting in the best interests of the country, but I cannot understand how1280 there can be responsible Government in a province in which the Governor is allowed to do a thing without a Ministry. It is one thing to say that the Governor should have a Ministry with which he agrees in a particular emergency, but it is quite a different thing to say that when an emergency arises the Governor should simply disregard the Ministry altogether. I think this point will have to be worked out in some deal, for I do not understand it. Coming to the question of the Services, there is one observation I am bound to make. I quite agree in principle that with provincial autonomy the power of regulating the Services in a province should belong to1400 that province, and that the provinces should have full liberty to indianize the Services as they desire and according to their means and circumstances. However, the observation which I feel bound to make is this: I cannot forget that Indians1440 are communal-minded. We do hope, and it is only a hope, that a time will come when all Indians will cease to look at problems from a communal point of view in administrative matters which are left to their charge, but that is only a hope; it is not a fact. The fact is that Indians do discriminate between class and class, community and community, in administering such discretion as is left to them in their administration of the law. That is a fact I cannot get over; it is a fact from which I have suffered immensely. 1540