Sir, my submission is that the future of political
parties in India will be so constituted that they will be divided on
religious lines and not on the lines of political or economic
differences. As I view the situation, it seems to me that in the
future constitution of India the Executive will be so divided that we shall
see less of the religious and racial distinctions coming to the surface and
we shall find a Hindu Minister having a party and a following containing a
large element of Muslims, and a Muslim Minister with a following of Hindus in
his group. If that happens, I do not understand how a Hindu Minister, who is in
charge of law and120 order, could administer law and order in
such a manner as to offend the susceptibilities of a part of the140
group which supports him in office. It seems to me, therefore, that the fears so
far as this particular aspect160 of the matter is concerned are rather unfounded.
The second thing which seems to be agreed upon more or less is
that not only should the Executive be a unified Executive but that the
responsibility of this unified Executive should be joint and not several. I
agree with these conclusions, but the points of difference that have arisen in
the course of the debate to which we have listened largely relate to the
composition of the Executive and it seems240 to me that there arise three different
questions for our consideration in connection with the composition of the
Executive. The first question is: should the Executive be confined to members
of the Legislature or should it be open to individuals280 who are officials or
non-officials and who are outside the Legislature? The second question is:
should it consist of members of the minority communities? The third question is
whether the Governor should have the responsibility of appointing the
Ministers himself320 or whether he should appoint the Chief
Minister and leave the matter of the selection of his colleagues to that Chief
Minister.
Sir, on all these three questions
my answer is in the affirmative. Personally, I do not see why360
the membership of the Cabinet should be rigorously restricted and confined to
the members of the Legislature. I also do not see why there should not
exist some provisions whereby the Executive should not be made as
representative as possible of all the communities that are represented in the
Legislature. Thirdly, regarding the power of the Governor to compose his420
Ministry, it seems to me that we must admit that it is his prerogative
to constitute the Ministry and that you must have discretion left to him
in the matter of selecting his men. But, Sir, when I say that I answer
these three questions in the affirmative, I make them subject to one supreme
condition. That supreme condition is480 that however the Executive is composed,
it shall abide by one principle, namely that it shall accept joint
responsibility. For instance, if this principle of joint responsibility is made
obligatory upon the Executive, it seems to me that the importation of a
foreign element into the Cabinet will not be a disturbing factor as
it is supposed to be. If the new-comer who does not belong to the Legislative
Council comes into the Cabinet and accepts joint responsibility along with560
the Cabinet, I do not see any reason why such a procedure should not
be permitted. It was pointed out that it may so happen that when a
Ministry is censured and it goes out, the official or the one600
who does not belong to the Legislature will remain while the other members of
the Cabinet will go out, and that when a new Ministry is formed, he will be
again tacked on to the Ministry and that he will640
be perpetually in the Council. It seems to me with all respects that
that is a somewhat fallacious view, because, unless the members who are
drawn from the Legislature to form the Ministry are prepared to take him along
with them and are prepared to bear the responsibility of his actions, they
will not consent to work when he accepts700 their advice and they
accept his advice. For instance, if a Prime Minister were so situated that
he could720 safely take an outsider into his Cabinet and at
the same time maintain the confidence of the House, I do not see why
the Chief Minister should be prevented from having that privilege
accorded to him. In the same way, if it was found possible that
the Governor should have powers to see that the different minority
communities are represented in his Cabinet, and if at the same time it is
made perfectly clear that whoever is appointed to the Cabinet800
must accept joint responsibility with the others, then I submit there is no
harm in allowing this sort of thing. It seems to me, therefore, that the point which
it is necessary to emphasize is that the Governor840 may have the power
which belongs to him as of right to compose the Ministry in any way he
likes, provided that the Ministry works on the principle of joint
responsibility.
Now the next question to which I
will address myself is how best to achieve this result, how best to bring out a
responsible and unified Executive. It seems to me there are two ways open to
us. One way is to define in the Constitution itself the character of the
Executive by law; the other is to leave to convention the constitution of the
Executive. Both these ways are adopted, as you all know. We all know that in
the Dominions of Canada, South Africa and Australia, responsible960
Government of a unified character is entirely a matter of convention. Every one
of us knows that in the Canadian980 Act or in the Acts of South Africa or
Australia the words “responsible Government” do not arise. It is not even
mentioned in the Canadian Act that the Ministers who are to advise the Governor
are to be members of the Legislature, although as a matter of fact they are. On
the other hand, in the constitutions of Ireland, Malta and Rhodesia, this
is a subject which is not left to convention, it is something
which is incorporated in law. In Ireland, we know that the Prime
Minister is a creature of statute, the joint responsibility is also defined by
law. 1080
I, therefore, think that we shall have to make our choice between the
two, and in making the choice, I for one would be guided by two considerations.
I fully realize that when a matter
is left to convention1120 it is possible that the
convention may be wrongly worked, that it may be abused, and may be
abused with impunity. The danger of matters being left to convention in a
country like India seems to me to be greater because there are no parties in
India which have a keen eye on the way in which the Constitution works
and we may have Ministers less interested in working the Constitution in the
right spirit than in maintaining their seats in1200 the Cabinet. On the other hand, it seems to me that where
matters are defined by law it must necessarily take away all the
discretion that must necessarily be left to a Governor. In a country
like India where the political field with all its communal and racial
difficulties is an absolutely uncharted sea, it seems to me that we1260
must so contrive that sufficient discretion will be left with the Governor. My
concrete suggestion, therefore, is that joint responsibility1280
of the Executive should be prescribed by law and that everything else should be
left to the discretion of the Governor, so that we shall have satisfied
both the conditions. We shall have provided that whatever responsibility there
is, it is a joint responsibility and that the composition of the Executive is
at the same time not hampered in such a manner that the communities which do
require to be represented in the Cabinet may be represented or that the
necessity which Prime Minister may feel of having a non-official or an outsider
in his Cabinet, is provided for. If we do that, if we insist by law, not
leaving it to the discretion of the Governor, I think all1400 other matters may be
left without any fear of abuse to the choice of the Governor.
Sir, the next topic which I will
take for consideration is that of the powers of the Governor vis-a-vis his
Executive. As we know, 1440 the present relations between the
Governor and the Minister are defined in section 52 of sub-clause 3. That
clause says that in all transferred matters, the Governor shall be guided by the
advice of his Ministers, and it adds a further proviso that if he sees
sufficient cause to dissent from the advice of his Ministers he may cause
action to be taken otherwise than in accordance with that advice. With all due
respect to those who framed that clause, I cannot help saying that this
clause as it now stands is a perversion of responsible Government. It makes
responsible Government a matter of convenience, a matter which may be
accepted and followed when it suits the Governor, whereas as a matter of fact
what we want is that responsible Government should be a matter of obligation.
If responsible Government means anything, it means that in whatever action the
Governor takes in any field he has the support of a1600
Ministry which has the confidence of the House.
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GLOSSARY
Susceptibilities - A
person’s feelings that are likely to be affected or hurt easily
Unfounded - Groundless, not based on or supported by facts
Importation - The introduction of an idea from a different place or
context
Prerogative - A special right that somebody has
Impunity - Exemption or immunity from punishment or from unpleasant
consequences
Perversion - The action of changing something from right to wrong or
from good to bad
