There
is a lesson from the ongoing failure of the monsoon session of Parliament.
Until there is a clear link between how one performs in Parliament and the
votes one gets in elections, politicians will not change the way they approach
their role as legislators. The House has not run smoothly so far, and given the
impasse, an immediate resolution does not appear to be on the horizon.
There is a possibility that the session will not see Parliament perform its
main role of deliberative law-making, holding the Executive accountable
and articulating citizen-centric issues. The immediate trigger
for the impasse is the Opposition's demand for a discussion and enquiry on
Pegasus, and the Government's reluctance to do so. It would be120 productive to have a discussion
on Pegasus and then pursue other legislative business. There could
well be other mechanisms140
to resolve the impasse too. But the question is why the Government and
the Opposition have not invested enough energy160
in resolving what is really not an intractable issue, and that goes to
the question of incentives. For a Government that enjoys a majority and can get
its legislative agenda through even amidst a din, the functioning of
the House does not make a material difference to its objectives.
Non-functioning allows it to evade hard questions. For the Opposition, the
ability to disrupt, make a noise, even snatch papers from ministers seems more
politically advantageous. They think this allows them240 to come across as belligerent and
aggressive. For Members of Parliament who would like the House to
function, there is little room to generate pressure because their
incentive lies in proving their loyalty to the party line. But at the280 core of it, Members of Parliament know
that what they do in Parliament will not affect their electoral prospects. Attendance,
questions asked, interventions in key debates hardly figure in the heat and
dust of electoral battles. Therefore, till parliamentary performance320 becomes a parameter in how citizens
judge their representatives, India's Parliament will continue to see
bursts of productivity interspersed with bouts of disruption.
Hon.
Speaker Sir, I strongly oppose the introduction of
the Bill as it is a draconian legislation360 to cut down the democratic and
legitimate rights of the workmen in the country. Sir, the provision in
the Bill is to prohibit the strike.
The Essential Defence Services Bill is violating the Fundamental
Right guaranteed in Article 19 of the Constitution of India. The sole intention
of the Bill is to curtail the democratic rights of the defence
civilian420 workers. Sir, the legitimate right of workers to
strike is guaranteed in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and also in
the latest Industrial Relations Code.
The infringement of the legal right of the employees is a
violation of all these rights as well as the provisions of the ILO
Conventions. The ILO Conventions have already stated that the right to480 strike is the democratic right of the
working class in the country. It is being unilaterally curtailed. The entire purpose of this legislation
is to cut down the democratic right of the working class in India. Hence, I
strongly oppose this Bill and I also appeal to the hon. Speaker that this is
not the way by which a Bill is introduced when the House is not in
order. This is a very important Bill. There are 41 ordnance factories560 in India. Now, the Government of
India under the Ministry of Defence is trying to convert them into
separate boards. It is an indirect way of privatisation of ordnance
factories in our country and the sole purpose of this Bill600 is to ban strikes. Sir, eighty-four thousand employees in the defence
sector, particularly in the ordnance factories, will be affected by this.
Banning the right to strike means taking away the legitimate right of the
workers. There is the Industrial640
Disputes Act of 1947. Even the labour courts are there. Unilaterally taking
away the right of the workers is an undemocratic step. I want to move
the amendments but passing a Bill in the pandemonium is not proper.
It is not fair as far as the parliamentary practice is concerned.
The Essential Defence Services Bill, 2021 seeks to replace the700 Ordinance promulgated in June
2021. The Bill allows the Central Government to prohibit strikes, lock-outs,
and lay-offs in units engaged720 in essential defence services. Essential defence services include
any service in any establishment or undertaking dealing with production
of goods or equipment required for defence related purposes, or any
establishment of the armed forces or connected with them or
defence. In addition, the Government may declare any service as an
essential defence service if its cessation would affect the production
of defence equipment or goods, operation or maintenance of industrial
establishments or units engaged in such production, or repair or800 maintenance of products connected with
defence. The Bill amends the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 to include
essential defence services under public utility services. Under
the Act, in case of public utility services, a six-week notice
must be given before persons840 employed in such services go on strike in breach of
contract or employers carrying on such services do lock-outs. Under the Bill,
strike is defined as cessation of work by a body of persons acting together.
It includes mass casual leave, coordinated refusal of any
number of persons to continue to work or accept employment, refusal to work
overtime, where such work is necessary for maintenance of essential defence
services, and any other conduct which results in, or is likely to result in,
disruption of work in essential defence services. Under the Bill, the Central
Government may prohibit strikes, lock-outs, and lay-offs in units engaged in
essential defence services. The Government may issue such order, if necessary,
in the interest960 of sovereignty and integrity of India, security of any State,
public order, public decency, or morality. The prohibition order will980 remain in force for six months,
and may be extended by another six months. Strikes and lock-outs that
are declared after the issue of the prohibition order, or had commenced before
the issue of prohibition order will be illegal. The prohibition will
not apply to lay-offs made due to power shortage or natural calamity, or
lay-offs of temporary or casual workmen. Employers violating the prohibition
order through illegal lock-outs or lay-offs will be punished with up to one
year imprisonment or Rs 10,000 fine, or both. Persons commencing
or participating in illegal strikes will be punished with up to one1080 year imprisonment or Rs 10,000 fine,
or both. Persons instigating, inciting, or taking actions to continue
illegal strikes, or knowingly supplying money for such purposes, will be
punished with up to two years’ imprisonment or Rs 15,000 fine, or both. 1120 Further, such an employee will
be liable to disciplinary action including dismissal as per the terms and
conditions of his service. In such cases, the concerned
authority is allowed to dismiss or remove the employee without any inquiry, if
it is not reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry. All offences
punishable under the Bill will be cognizable and non-bailable.
The General Insurance Business (Nationalization)
Amendment Bill, 2021 seeks to amend the General Insurance Business (Nationalization)
Act, 1972. The Act was1200 enacted to nationalize all private companies undertaking general
insurance business in India. The Bill seeks to provide for a greater private
sector participation in the public sector insurance companies
regulated under the Act. The old Act set up the General Insurance
Corporation of India. The businesses of the companies
nationalized under the Act were restructured in four subsidiary companies
of1260 General Insurance
Corporation of India, namely, National Insurance, New India Assurance,
Oriental Insurance, and United India Insurance. The Act was1280 subsequently amended in 2002 to
transfer the control of these four subsidiary companies from General
Insurance Corporation of India to the Central Government, thereby making them independent
companies. Since the year 2000, General Insurance Corporation
of India exclusively undertakes reinsurance business. The Act requires
that shareholding of the Central Government in the above five companies must be
at least 51 per cent. The Bill removes this provision. The Act defines
general insurance business as fire, marine or miscellaneous insurance
business. It excludes capital redemption and annuity certain
business from the definition. Capital redemption insurance involves
payment of a sum of money on a specific date by the insurer after the beneficiary
pays premiums periodically. Under annuity certain insurance, the insurer1400 pays the beneficiary over a period of
time. The Bill removes this definition and instead, refers to the
definition provided by the Insurance Act, 1938. Under the Insurance
Act, capital redemption and annuity certain are included within general
insurance business. 1440 The Bill provides that the Act will not apply to the specified insurers
from the date on which the Central Government relinquishes
control of the insurer. Control means the power to appoint a majority of
directors of a specified insurer, or to have power over its
management or policy decisions. The Act empowers the Central Government to
notify the terms and conditions of service of employees of the specified
insurers. The Bill provides that schemes formulated by the Central Government
in this regard will be deemed to have been adopted by the
insurer. The board of directors of the insurer may change these
schemes or frame new policies. Further, powers of the Central Government
under such schemes framed under the Act will be transferred to the board
of directors of the insurer. The Bill specifies that a director of a
specified insurer, who is not a whole-time director, will be held liable only for
certain acts. 1596
