The appellant has been convicted for the offences punishable under
Sections 333, 353 and 451 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The Sessions
Court convicted the appellant for all three offences. For the offences
punishable under Sections 451 and 353 of the Indian Penal Code, the
appellant was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year
each and for the offence punishable under Section 333 of Indian Penal Code,
he was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years with a
fine of Rs. 2,000. By100 the impugned judgment, the High Court while upholding the
conviction, brought down the substantive sentence to rigorous
imprisonment for six120 months for each of the three offences. On
9th May 2023, this Court issued a notice confined only to the sentencing part.
The learned counsel appearing for the appellant firstly submitted
that considering the facts of the case, the appellant deserves to be
granted the benefit of probation under Section 360 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 and the Probation of the Offenders Act, 1958. Secondly, he
submitted that the incident200 complained occurred on 1st December 1992 and during the period
of the last thirty and a half years, during the pendency of the trial
and appeal, the appellant was all throughout on bail.
The learned counsel submitted that240 the appellant is a woman whose
present age is 62 years. He submitted that considering the long passage of time
of thirty years and more from the date of the offence and other relevant
factors, even if the benefit of probation cannot be given to the
appellant, she deserves to be let off only on payment of a fine.300 The learned Additional Advocate
General appearing for the respondent submitted that the appellant has misbehaved
with PW1 who is a public servant and obstructed her and PW6 from discharging
their official duties and therefore, in fact, stringent punishment was
called for. Moreover, the High Court has already shown leniency by reducing the
sentence.
It is necessary for us to note360 the nature of the offence. The
appellant claims to be a social worker belonging to a political
party. A written complaint was made by PW1 on 1st December 1992 to the
Police. She was working as a Deputy400 Director in the Directorate of Women and Child Development at
Bhopal. At that time, PW6 was posted as the Commissioner in the
Directorate. On 1st December 1992, PW6 was conducting an official meeting in
his chamber in the presence of PW1 and other officers. The case of the
prosecution is that when the meeting was in progress, suddenly, the appellant
barged into the chamber of PW6. She threw a file at PW6 and started shouting in
abusive language. When PW1480 tried to stop her, the appellant pushed her. As a result,
the PW1 sustained a fracture in the little right500 finger. The appellant claimed that
she was the sister of a Member of Parliament and threatened to
remove PW6 from his post. The Sessions Court and the High Court believed the testimonies
of the eyewitnesses and especially of PW1 and PW6. Considering the
nature of the offence, we are of the considered view that the benefit of
probation can be extended to the appellant.
As noted in our order dated 9th May 2023, no case was made out to
interfere with the order of conviction and the notice was confined to sentence.
Therefore, the question is about600 the quantum of sentence. Looking at the findings recorded
by the Sessions Court and the High Court, there are certain relevant factors
for deciding the question of showing leniency to the appellant. For espousing
the cause of the labourers, the appellant visited the office of the
Directorate. Evidence of PW1 and PW2 indicated that the appellant had sent a
slip of her name to PW6 which was kept on the table of PW6 as she wanted to
meet him. After waiting for a considerable time, as she was not allowed to meet
PW6, she forced her entry to his cabin700 and complained that she was made to wait. PW1 admitted that the
appellant was not annoyed with her. She stated720 that the appellant did not indulge
in any scuffle with her. When she tried to stop the appellant, she was pushed
by the appellant and that is how she received injury to her little right finger.
The incident is more than thirty years old. During the last thirty and a half
years, when the trial and appeal were pending, the appellant was all throughout
on bail. Even in this appeal, an exemption has been granted to her from the
requirement800 of surrendering. During this long period of more than 30
long years, there was no allegation of any objectionable activity
by her. The appellant is a female whose present age is 62 years.
At the same time, we cannot840 ignore that the appellant indulged
in the objectionable act of entering the chamber of PW6 who was discharging his
official duty as a public servant. At that time, PW6 was holding
a meeting with the officials including PW1. The appellant abused PW6 by using
very bad language. At that time, PW1 tried to stop the appellant but the
appellant pushed900 PW1. As a result, PW1 suffered a fracture in her little
right finger. That is how both Courts have held the appellant guilty of the
offences punishable under Sections 333, 353 and 451 of the IPC. The offence
punishable under Section 333 of voluntarily causing grievous hurt to
deter a public servant960 from discharging his duty attracts punishment by imprisonment
of either description for a term which may extend to ten years with a
fine. The offence punishable under Section 353 of using criminal force to deter
a public servant1000 from discharging his duty attracts punishment of imprisonment of
either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with a fine, or
with both. Lastly, the offence punishable under Section 451 of
committing house trespass in order to commit any offence punishable with
imprisonment, attracts imprisonment of either description for a term which may
extend to two years and a fine.
Considering the seriousness of the offence punishable under
Section 333 of the IPC and1080 since the punishment prescribed is both of imprisonment of either
description and a fine, obviously, the appellant cannot be let1100 off only on a fine. However,
considering the circumstances set out in paragraph 5 above, we
are of the view that the appellant deserves to be shown leniency when it
comes to the substantive sentence. The distinct factors set out
in paragraph no.5, taken individually, do not constitute a ground by
itself to show leniency. For example, only because an accused is on bail for
a long time, it is no ground by itself to show leniency.1177
